University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles,
book chapters and other publications

Jepson School of Leadership Studies

10-2020

A Dilemma for Buddhist Reductionsim
Javier S. Hidalgo
University of Richmond, jhidalgo@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/jepson-faculty-publications
Part of the Buddhist Studies Commons, and the Continental Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Hidalgo, Javier. "A Dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism." Philosophy East and West, vol. 70 no. 4, 2020, p.
977-998. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/pew.2020.0072.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at UR
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book
chapters and other publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

A DILEMMA FOR BUDDHIST REDUCTIONISM
Javier Hidalgo
Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond
hidalgoj@gmail.com

I. Introduction
Buddhists accept the doctrine of non-self. Almost all Buddhists agree that
selves or persons are unreal.1 Instead, the term “person” is merely a way of
referring to a causal series of psychophysical elements. Nonetheless,
Buddhists also claim that persons are real in a different sense. Persons are
conventionally real. So, Buddhist philosophers deny the ultimate reality of
persons and afﬁrm their conventional existence.
How is it possible for persons to exist and yet not exist? Buddhist
Reductionism is an answer to this question. Buddhist Reductionism gives an
analysis of what it means for persons to lack ultimate existence and retain
conventional existence. Buddhist Reductionists claim that persons don’t
belong in our ﬁnal ontology. So, it is false that persons ultimately exist. But
persons are conventionally real in the sense that positing the existence of
persons is useful. If we accept that persons are real, this will help us to
achieve desirable outcomes, such as the minimization of suffering. Furthermore, Buddhist Reductionists extend their analysis to all composite entities,
not just persons. They defend a kind of mereological nihilism according to
which all partite entities are unreal. Buddhist Reductionists contend that the
only real existents are particular bundles of tropes, such as color and shape.
In recent years, Mark Siderits and other philosophers have developed
important and powerful arguments in favor of Buddhist Reductionism.2
In this article, I will raise an objection to Buddhist Reductionism. My
objection centers on the nature of reasons. It seems obvious that there are
reasons, such as reasons for action and reasons for belief. Yet I will show that
Buddhist Reductionists are unable to account adequately for the existence of
reasons. More precisely, I will argue that Buddhist Reductionists face a
dilemma. They can understand reasons either as composite or impartite
properties. If reasons are composite, then it is false that reasons exist. And, if it
is false that reasons exist, then Buddhist Reductionism entails that there are no
reasons for action or belief, including reasons to believe Buddhist Reductionism. Alternatively, Buddhist Reductionists can view reasons as impartite
properties. If reasons are impartite, then reasons must be irreducible normative
properties. But the existence of irreducible normative properties is incompatible with other important Buddhist commitments, such as the causal efﬁcacy
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criterion of ultimate reality, nominalism about abstract objects, and perhaps
dependent origination. So, on one horn of the dilemma Buddhist Reductionism
has unacceptable consequences, and on the other horn Buddhist Reductionism conﬂicts with key Buddhist tenants.
I will proceed as follows. Section 2 will clarify Buddhist Reductionism.
Section 3 will lay out the dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism. I will then
consider objections to my arguments. One objection holds that, even if
reasons lack ultimate existence, reasons may be still be conventional truths.
Another objection is that there is a viable alternative understanding of value
in the Abhidharma tradition that may escape the dilemma that I pose for
Buddhist Reductionism. I will rebut these objections in section 4. Section 5
concludes the article.

II. Buddhist Reductionism
My presentation and subsequent critique of Buddhist Reductionism will
focus primarily on Mark Siderits’ reconstruction and defense of this view,
although I will also draw on other philosophers who endorse components of
Buddhist Reductionism.3 According to Siderits, Buddhist Reductionism has
four major components. First, Buddhist Reductionism advances a theory of
truth. According to this theory, there are two truths—conventional and
ultimate truths. Some statements are conventionally true because they are
useful, and some statements are ultimately true because they describe what
reality is like. Second, Buddhist Reductionism endorses mereological nihilism. Mereological nihilism says that anything that we can reduce to
constituents lacks ultimate existence. So, all composite entities are ultimately
unreal. Third, Buddhist Reductionists advance a speciﬁc ontology. They
believe that the only irreducible entities are bundles of tropes, such as shape
and mass. Finally, Buddhist Reductionists advance a distinctive kind of
consequentialist ethics. I will now elaborate on these commitments.
Buddhist philosophers draw a distinction between ultimate and conventional truths, and Buddhist Reductionists offer a distinctive analysis of these
truths. Here is their deﬁnition of conventional truth: a statement is conventionally true if and only if the acceptance of this statement reliably leads to
successful practice.4 Consider the claim “the sterilization of surgical instruments prevents infection in patients.” This sentence is conventionally true
because it helps us to avoid suffering. If we—and surgeons in particular—
accept this statement, then surgeons will sterilize their instruments before
surgery, and this will cause fewer patients to suffer as the result of infections.
Thus, this statement leads to successful practice.
The deﬁnition of ultimate truth is: a statement is ultimately true if and
only if it both corresponds to the facts and neither asserts nor presupposes
the existence of what is not ultimately real.5 Statements are ultimately true if
they accurately describe what reality is really like. Suppose for the sake of
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illustration that string theory describes the fundamental structure of reality. If
so, then everything is composed of one-dimensional vibrating strings.
Statements about these strings can be ultimately true. After all, if inﬁnitesimal strings are the deepest nature of reality, then statements about these
strings may correspond to the facts and refrain from asserting the existence
of things that are unreal.
The second major feature of Buddhist Reductionism is mereological
nihilism. Mereological nihilism says that only impartite entities are ultimately
real, and that composite entities are unreal. So, anything that we can reduce
to more fundamental constituents doesn’t exist. For example, cars are
composite entities. Cars are composed of engines, fuel tanks, wheels, and so
on. So, it is false that cars belong in our ﬁnal ontology because they are
partite. Cars lack reality above and beyond the individual parts that make
them up.
Buddhists extend mereological nihilism to persons. Persons are composed of mental and physical states, such as bodies, consciousness, and
mental formations. If persons are composite entities, it follows that persons
lack existence from the perspective of ultimate reality. The dialogue Milinda
Pañha is an inﬂuential statement of this view. In this dialogue with the IndoGreek king of Bactria, the Buddhist monk Nāgasena denies that he exists.
He says that “Nāgasena’ exists as a mere designation. However, in the
ultimate sense there is no person as such that is found.”6 Nāgasena’s
reasoning is that he is a partite entity composed of material form and mental
states and thus cannot exist. Nāgasena’s argument depends on the view that
composite entities are unreal.
But why should we accept mereological nihilism? Buddhist Reductionists
offer different arguments for this position. One of the most inﬂuential is the
neither-identical-nor-distinct argument. The argument goes like this. If
wholes exist, then either wholes are identical with their parts or distinct from
them. To take Nāgasena’s example, if a chariot exists as a whole, then it is
either identical with the components that make it up (the spokes, wheels,
etc.) or distinct from these components. It is impossible for the whole and
the parts to be identical because they have different properties. The parts are
many and the whole is one. Assuming the indiscernibility of identicals, the
parts and the whole can’t be identical. Is the whole distinct from its parts?
This seems false because the whole gains all of its causal powers from the
parts. If the whole gains all of its causal powers from the parts, then we can
explain the whole entirely in terms of its parts. Entities that can be entirely
explained in terms of facts about their constituent parts are not distinct from
their parts. Therefore, the whole is neither identical with nor distinct from its
parts. We can conclude that wholes don’t exist.
There are other arguments for mereological nihilism, but they’re not
important to my argument in this article and so I will put them to one side
for now. Let’s move on to the ﬁnal major component of Buddhist
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Reductionism: Abhidharma metaphysics. Buddhists in the Abhidharma
tradition hold that the fundamental constituents of reality are dharmas.
According to one plausible interpretation, dharmas are tropes.7 Tropes are
features of particular entities. Tropes are things like the color, shape, or
texture of an object. Tropes aren’t universals. Rather, they are properties that
are located in a particular place and time. What we call “universals” are just
aggregations of particular tropes or dharmas. According to many Abhidharma philosophers, dharmas are also momentary. While dharmas exist for
a time, they rapidly disappear. Finally, dharmas are impartite and simple.
We are unable to reduce them to more fundamental properties. So,
Abhidharma philosophers think that objects are composed of bundles of
impartite dharmas. When combined with mereological nihilism, the upshot
is that the world we know is illusory. Reality in fact consists in an ever
changing succession of dharmas.
Furthermore, Buddhist Reductionism accepts a causal criterion of
existence. According to Siderits’ reconstruction, Buddhist Reductionists
believe that only entities that have causal properties can exist. One of the
most inﬂuential formulations of the causal efﬁcacy criterion is Dharmakīrti’s
claim that “whatever has the capacity for causal efﬁcacy is ultimately
existent; everything else is just conventionally existent.”8 Siderits afﬁrms this
causal efﬁcacy criterion. Siderits says that “Buddhist Reductionism . . .
relies on the causal efﬁcacy criterion for real entities” and that “the panBuddhist position [is] that causal efﬁcacy is the mark of the ultimately real.”9
If the causal efﬁcacy criterion is correct, then properties must have causal
powers in order to be ultimately real.
Now that I’ve sketched out some of the main contours of Buddhist
Reductionism, let’s return to the Buddhist analysis of persons. Remember
that Buddhist Reductionists believe that persons are ultimately unreal and
conventionally existent. I have already explained why Buddhist Reductionists deny that persons exist: persons are composite entities and therefore
can’t be real from an ultimate perspective. But Buddhist Reductionists say
that persons are conventionally real. Why? Buddhist Reductionists think that
accepting that persons exist is useful. In particular, accepting that there are
persons minimizes suffering better than other possible conventions. So,
statements about persons can be conventionally true because positing the
existence of persons promotes good consequences.
Siderits gives the following illustration.10 We teach children to care
about their futures, even when they’re disinclined to care. For example, we
try to get our children to brush their teeth, eat their vegetables, and study for
their next spelling test, despite the fact that they ﬁnd all of these activities to
be unpleasant. In doing this, we encourage children to identify with their
pasts and futures and conceive of themselves as enduring entities with
prudential interests. This habituation is useful because it reduces pain on
net. There will be fewer toothaches if children brush their teeth. More
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generally, there will be less suffering if we identify with our futures and seek
to avoid painful outcomes. In this respect, the personhood convention is
helpful.
Here’s another illustration, again from Siderits.11 If persons lack reality,
then no one can deserve anything. Desert seems to be a property that only
persons could possess. After all, you and I don’t deserve anything if we
don’t exist. Nonetheless, it’s a good thing that judges treat murderers as if
they were deserving of punishment. This is so because punishing murderers
reduces suffering overall by deterring future murders. Thus, treating murderers as if they were persons promotes utility and helps explain why the
personhood convention is justiﬁed.
Siderits contends that we should adopt the personhood convention
because this minimizes suffering overall. But why should we aim to
minimize suffering overall? Here Siderits and other Buddhist Reductionists
invoke Sāntideva’s argument in Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra.12 Sāntideva says that
a person is an aggregate of psychophysical constituents, similar to how an
army is an aggregate of soldiers. Along with Buddhists in the Abhidharma
tradition, Sāntideva suggests that aggregates are unreal. Since persons are
aggregates of psychophysical constituents, they’re unreal as well. If persons
are unreal, it is false that we should only minimize our own suffering. We
should reduce suffering irrespective of its location.
We can break down this interpretation of Sāntideva’s argument as
follows:
1. There are reasons to minimize suffering in my own life.
2. Persons ultimately don’t exist.
3. If there are reasons to minimize suffering in my own life and persons
ultimately don’t exist, then there are reasons to minimize suffering
irrespective of the location of this suffering.
4. So, there are reasons to minimize suffering irrespective of its location.
Premise 1 holds that we should reduce our own suffering. Everyone agrees
that we should prevent our own suffering. Moreover, Sāntideva suggests that
we are rationally required to minimize suffering on net. He writes: “All
doctors use painful treatments to restore health. It follows that to put an end
to many sufferings, a slight one must be endured.”13 By the same logic, we
should minimize sufferings on balance within our lives.
Premise 2 is an afﬁrmation of the Buddhist doctrine of non-self, which I
have already discussed. Premise 3 is the conditional claim that, if there are
reasons to minimize suffering in my own life and persons ultimately don’t
exist, then there are reasons to minimize suffering irrespective of the location
of this suffering. The motivation for this premise is that we lack grounds for
prioritizing the reduction of our own suffering if persons are unreal. If
persons are unreal, then the fact that suffering is yours and not mine is
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irrelevant because ultimately there is no such thing yours and mine. There
are just pains, and, if pains are to be minimized, then they must be
minimized regardless of where they occur.
Siderits and other authors like Charles Goodman who are sympathetic to
Buddhist Reductionism endorse this argument for minimizing suffering. This
argument supports a kind of Buddhist consequentialism. Siderits remarks:
“welfare is constituted by purely impersonal states and events, and that it is
these that ought to be considered in determining what to do.”14 This
consequentialist moral theory justiﬁes the personhood convention. We ought
to reduce suffering overall. According to Siderits, the best way to reduce
suffering overall is to conceive of ourselves to be persons. For sure, Siderits
maintains that we should deviate from the personhood convention when this
would produce superior impersonal outcomes. But, for the most part, it’s a
good thing for us to think of ourselves as persons.
This completes my description of Buddhist Reductionism. I will now
develop an objection to it

III. The Dilemma
My objection to Buddhist Reductionism centers on the nature of reasons.
Reasons are considerations that count in favor of A doing X. We think that
we have reasons for action, reasons for belief, reasons for attitudes, and so
on. For example, you might think:
(i) The fact that some action would promote your survival is a reason to
do it.
(ii) The fact that some statement is true is a reason to believe it.
(iii) The fact that someone is altruistic is a reason to admire this
person.15
Claims (i)–(iii) seem plausible. Buddhist Reductionists also agree that there
are reasons. In particular, they claim:
(iv) The fact that some action would minimize suffering on net is a
reason to do it.
But can Buddhist Reductionists make sense of reasons? How do reasons ﬁt
into Buddhist ontology?.
Buddhist Reductionists have two ways of understanding the nature of
reasons: either (a) reasons are composite or (b) these reasons are irreducible
and impartite. Either option leads us into trouble. If we assume (a), then it
turns out that reasons are unreal. If we opt for (b), then Buddhist
Reductionism contradicts fundamental Buddhist commitments. So, both
options for Buddhist Reductionism have unacceptable implications. Let me
now explain the horns of this dilemma in detail.
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A. Reasons are Composites
Let’s start with the ﬁrst option, the position that reasons are composites.
How can reasons be composites?.
A Humean analysis of reasons illustrates how it is possible for reasons to
be composites.16 This account holds that psychological states, such as
desires, explain reasons. More speciﬁcally, a Humean theory of reasons
relies on the idea of constitutive explanations. Consider an analogy. A
triangle is a composite entity. A triangle is constituted by three lines
arranged in a certain way. The arrangements of lines explains what it is for
something to be a triangle. Something is a triangle because it has three
sides. Similarly, a Humean theory of reasons holds that reasons are
constituted by psychological states. To have a reason to perform some
action just is to have a psychological state that disposes you to perform this
action under the right conditions.
Here’s an illustration. Suppose that Sam has a reason to go to a party at
his friend’s house.17 The explanation for this reason is that Sam has a desire
to go to the party if he thinks it will be fun. Sam believes that the party
tonight will be fun. Thus, he has a reason to go to the party. Sam’s desires
and beliefs about the party just are what it is for Sam to have a reason to
attend the party. Sam’s psychological states are constitutive of his reasons.
Consider also our reasons to reduce suffering. A Humean might say that our
reasons to minimize suffering are constituted by our psychological disposition to avoid suffering under certain circumstances. In this way, we can
decompose reasons into more fundamental constituents—a person’s psychological states. A Humean theory is a reductive theory of reasons: it says that
we can reduce reasons to non-normative properties.
Notice that reasons are partite in the Humean account. Reasons have
constituents: psychological states. However, Buddhist Reductionism is
committed to mereological nihilism. Mereological nihilism says that there
are no composite or partite entities. It is false that there are chariots. There
are only a collection of wheels, spokes, carriages, and other components
that we group together for our own purposes. The only things that exist are
simple and impartite dharmas. Mereological nihilism is crucial to Buddhist
Reductionism because it underwrites the rejection of selves and persons. As
persons are partite, they lack existence. Yet, if mereological nihilism is a
claim about the metaphysical status of all composite entities, then it should
apply to reasons, too. So, if composite entities are unreal and reasons are
composite, then reasons are unreal. Reasons are mere conceptual constructions.
The unreality of reasons raises serious problems for Buddhist Reductionism. If reasons don’t exist, then Buddhist Reductionists may need to jettison
their ethical commitments. Buddhist Reductionism depends on the view that
there are reasons to reduce suffering. But, if there are no reasons, then there
are no reasons to minimize suffering or bring about other good outcomes.
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Buddhist Reductionists believe that persons are conventionally real because
the personhood convention brings about desirable outcomes. Yet, without
reasons to bring about good outcomes, there is no reason to afﬁrm the
reality of persons. The result is that Buddhist Reductionism collapses into
eliminativism about persons, the view that persons are entirely unreal.
Many philosophers think that the Humean analysis of reasons applies to
reasons for action. Sam has a reason to go the party because he has a desire
to do so. Yet some philosophers believe that we can give all reasons a
Humean analysis, including epistemic reasons for belief. Sharon Street holds
this view.18 She thinks that epistemic reasons depend on our attitudes. We
have reasons to believe true propositions only because we have practical
reasons to engage in the “belief business.” The belief business is the project
of determining whether our beliefs are true or false. So, our epistemic
reasons depend on our practical reasons. For example, we have reason to
believe the truth about whether there’s a tiger in the bush next to us because
we have a reason to avoid being eaten. Our practical reasons, like our
reason to escape being eaten, are the reasons to form true beliefs about
tigers. But Street argues that our practical reasons are dependent on our
attitudes. Practical reasons are constructed out of, or constituted by, these
attitudes. If epistemic reasons depend on practical reasons and practical
reasons are attitude-dependent, then epistemic reasons are attitude-dependent as well.
Suppose that Street is right that epistemic reasons depend on, or are
constructed out of, psychological states. Thus, if mereological nihilism is
true, then there are no reasons for belief, as reasons for belief are constituted
by attitudes. If there are no reasons—including epistemic reasons—then we
lack reasons to believe Buddhist Reductionism. This seems like a problematic result. Consider an analogy. Suppose that I made the following two
claims:
(1) It is deﬁnitely raining outside.
(2) I have absolutely no reason at all to believe that it is raining outside.
There’s something wrong with the conjunction of these two statements. The
problem is that (2) undermines any reason to endorse (1). Similarly, my
argument suggests that Buddhist Reductionists are committed to the
conjunction of the following claims:
(3) Buddhist Reductionism is true.
(4) There is no reason to believe Buddhist Reductionism.
Claim (4) undermines our reasons for believing (3). Buddhist Reductionism
entails that we lack any reason believe it. In this respect, Buddhist
Reductionism seems self-defeating.19
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Maybe Buddhist Reductionists can somehow avoid global skepticism
about reasons. Some error theorists about normativity try to drive a wedge
between normative reasons and epistemic reasons. These error theorists
deny that epistemic reasons are normative. Instead, reasons for belief are
merely descriptive statements.20 Suppose that these error theorists are right.
Perhaps we can then restrict skepticism about normativity to reasons for
action and exempt reasons for belief. That would still be bad news for
Buddhist Reductionists. This skepticism would undercut the ethical component of Buddhist Reductionism and the conventional existence of persons.
So, if we consider reasons to be composites, then Buddhist Reductionists
must jettison at least some of their core commitments.21
B. Reasons are Impartite
Let us now consider the other horn of the dilemma. Recall that there are
two options for Buddhist Reductionists: they can believe that reasons are
composite or impartite. Now let us consider the second option, the view
that reasons are impartite. If reasons are impartite, then they are irreducible.
We can’t decompose reasons into more fundamental constituents. Why?
Buddhist Reductionists say that anything that is reducible to some other
properties must be composite in nature. And anything that is impartite is
irreducible. It follows, then, that impartite reasons are irreducible properties.
Reasons are among the fundamental constituents of the world, along with
tropes like color, mass, and shape.
This understanding of reasons has something in common with contemporary non-naturalism about reasons. Derek Parﬁt, Thomas Scanlon, and
other philosophers contend that reasons are irreducible normative truths.22
Consider the claim that there are reasons to minimize suffering. Nonnaturalists would say that these reasons are irreducible. The reasons to
minimize suffering are not identical with or reducible to non-normative
statements, such as the fact that I have a desire to avoid suffering. It is also
false that reasons are constructed out of, or constituted by, other properties.
Rather, reasons are sui generis normative properties. Scanlon puts the point
as follows:
[T]ruths about reasons are fundamental in the sense that truths about reasons
are not reducible to or identiﬁable with non-normative truths, such as truths
about the natural world of physical objects, causes and effects, nor can they be
explained in terms of notions of rationality or rational agency that are not
themselves claims about reasons.23

Non-naturalism about reasons and the view that reasons are impartite share
the implication that reasons are irreducible properties. So, if we think that
reasons are impartite, then, surprisingly, it seems that Buddhist Reductionists
must be committed to something like non-naturalism about reasons.
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Here’s a problem though: it is unclear whether the view that reasons are
irreducible normative properties is consistent with other Buddhist commitments. The issue is that if reasons are irreducible normative properties then
it seems false that they have causal powers. The claim that irreducible
normative properties lack causal efﬁcacy is the standard view among
contemporary non-naturalists. Parﬁt writes: “[w]hen some fact gives us a
reason to have some belief, this normative property of being reason-giving is
not an empirically discoverable feature of the natural world. Nor could we
be causally affected by such normative properties.”24 David Enoch contends
that basic “normative truths are causally inert.”25 Scanlon, Thomas Nagel,
and other non-naturalists agree that irreducible normative properties don’t
have causal powers.26.
Why should we believe that irreducible normative properties lack causal
efﬁcacy? To motivate this commitment, notice that reductionist theories of
reason are unable to justify the view that normative truths are independent
of our attitudes and judgments. Consider ideally coherent malevolence. Let’s
imagine a person who has the sole aim of maximizing the suffering of
others. And assume that this malevolent person is entirely coherent. Even if
this evildoer had full information and his beliefs and attitudes were
completely consistent, he would desire to inﬂict suffering on others. Does
this evildoer have normative reason to maximize suffering? If our normative
reasons are a function of our attitudes or desires, then this evildoer seems to
have decisive normative reason to inﬂict suffering. This result is counterintuitive to many of us. Yet non-naturalists can say that the coherent evildoer
is making a mistake. They can claim that, irrespective of what your desires
and attitudes are like, the stance-independent truth is that you don’t have
normative reasons to maximize the suffering of others.27.
We can now see one reason why non-naturalists are led to conclude
that normative properties lack casual powers. If natural properties were
causally or constitutively responsible for normative truths, then normative
truths would depend on the natural ones, like an agent’s attitudes, desires,
or judgments. And these commitments rule out the stance-independence of
normative truths. Non-naturalists have other reasons for rejecting the causal
efﬁcacy of normative properties as well. Non-naturalists argue that we are
unable to reduce the meaning of normative claims to statements about
causally efﬁcacious natural properties.28 In their view, the claim that “I have
a normative reason in favor of performing action X” contains information
that is absent in the claim that “I have a desire to perform action X” or other
similar claims about natural properties in the world. Non-naturalists contend
that natural and normative properties are simply too different for naturalistic
analyses of normative properties to be successful.
Let’s suppose that contemporary non-naturalists are right that irreducible
normative properties lack causal powers. This implies that Buddhist
Reductionism and non-naturalism about normativity are incompatible. Recall
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that Siderits accepts a causal efﬁcacy criterion of existence. A causal efﬁcacy
criterion of existence holds that only properties or entities that have causal
powers are part of ultimate reality. A range of other Buddhist philosophers
endorses this view as well. For example, in explaining why Buddhists reject
the existence of universals, Jay Garﬁeld remarks: “Since universals are
abstracta, and hence both causally inert and permanent, they fail to satisfy
the most fundamental Buddhist criteria for reality—causal interdependence
and spatio-temporal locality.”29 This causal efﬁcacy criterion seems compatible with a reductionist account of reasons. If reasons were reducible to
desires and attitudes, then they would be part of the causal fabric of the
universe. After all, desires and attitudes are part of the causal nexus. But are
irreducible normative properties consistent with the causal efﬁcacy criterion?
It looks like the answer to this question is “no.” Only properties with causal
powers belong in our ﬁnal ontology. Yet irreducible normative properties
lack causal efﬁcacy. Thus, if irreducible normative properties are real, then
the causal efﬁcacy criterion is false.
You might think that a Buddhist Reductionist should jettison the causal
efﬁcacy criterion, especially if the alternative is to deny the existence of
reasons altogether. The problem is that if Buddhist Reductionists afﬁrm the
existence of irreducible normative reasons, this also puts pressure on other,
related Buddhist commitments. For example, the causal efﬁcacy criterion
appears to be conceptually related to the doctrine of dependent origination.
One prominent interpretation of dependent origination is that everything has
a casual explanation and, moreover, that all entities are subject to
origination, duration, and cessation.30 All entities are impermanent and
caught in a chain of causation, and there is no reality above and beyond the
causal web. This interpretation of dependent origination suggests that all that
exists has a causal backstory. If so, then dependent origination and the
causal efﬁcacy criterion are similar or perhaps even equivalent ideas.
Most Buddhist philosophers are also nominalists. They deny the
existence of universals in part because universals are causally impotent.
Universals are eternal and unchanging entities. Eternal and unchanging
objects lack the power to produce causal effects at particular times. If the
criterion that distinguishes what is real from what is merely conventional is
causal efﬁcacy, then universals are unreal. But, if irreducible normative
reasons exist, then why not universals too? Both are causally inert. Thus, if
normative properties are real, then it is hard to see why we should deny the
existence of universals and other abstract objects.
Contemporary philosophers often object to non-naturalism about reasons
on epistemological grounds. They ask how we could come to acquire
knowledge about irreducible normative properties. Ordinarily, we gain knowledge through causal interaction. Imagine that I claim that my dishwasher is
broken. How do I know this? Well, I causally interacted with my dishwasher
in various ways. Perhaps I tried to start it up, but it didn’t work. Or I examined
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it closely and noticed some of the machinery was damaged. Even abstruse
scientiﬁc knowledge depends on causal interactions. We can understand the
properties of black holes and electrons because they affect our environment.31
But irreducible normative truths are causally inefﬁcacious. We can’t see or
touch them. So, how then can we possibly know about them?.
This objection to abstract objects is dependent on the causal theory of
knowledge. According to this theory, knowledge requires a causal link
between the knower and the object of knowledge. Many Buddhist epistemologists endorse a causal theory of knowledge. For instance, Dharmakīrti claims
that we acquire knowledge of the world by causally interacting with it.
Dharmakīrti says that “that is perceptible which causes the content of
awareness to track its own presence and absence.”32 Our environment causes
perceptual awareness of unique particulars, and this is how we gain knowledge of them. The only other epistemic instrument is inference, and inference
is reliable only insofar as it depends on perception.33.
This suggests another problem with irreducible normative properties. If
Buddhists are committed to a causal theory of knowledge, then it is a
mystery how they can make sense of knowledge of reasons. Buddhist
epistemology arguably lacks the resources to explain how we can acquire
knowledge of normativity. So, if there are irreducible normative reasons and
we have knowledge of them, then at least some Buddhists must jettison their
theory of knowledge. Alternatively, suppose that Buddhists want to retain
their theory of knowledge. Buddhists thus seem committed to epistemic
skepticism about reasons. There seems to be no way that we could come to
possess knowledge of causally inert properties.
I won’t continue belaboring the point. The view that reasons are
impartite and irreducible is incompatible with central Buddhist philosophical
commitments. If Buddhist Reductionists are committed to the existence of
irreducible normative properties, then they must reject these commitments.
Perhaps other kinds of reductionists can reply: “so much the worse for
Buddhism!” But this response is unavailable to Buddhist Reductionists. At
the very least, Buddhist Reductionists have compelling reasons to refrain
from claiming that reasons are irreducible.
Summary
This completes my initial presentation of a dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism. To recap, my argument goes like this:
1. Buddhist Reductionists must accept either that normative reasons are
composite or impartite.
2. If reasons are composite, then reasons ultimately do not exist.
3. If reasons ultimately do not exist, then ultimately there are no reasons
to reduce suffering, afﬁrm the conventional existence of persons, and
(perhaps) believe Buddhist Reductionism.
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4. If reasons are impartite, then the causal efﬁcacy criterion of ultimate
existence, nominalism, and other important Buddhist doctrines are
false.
5. So, Buddhist Reductionists must either (a) accept that ultimately there
are no reasons to reduce suffering, afﬁrm the conventional existence
of persons, and believe Buddhist Reductionism, or (b) conclude that
key Buddhist commitments are false.
I will now consider how Buddhist Reductionists might respond to my
argument.

IV. Objections and Responses
A. Are Reasons Conventional?
My argument against Buddhist Reductionism takes the form of a dilemma. If
we opt for either of the two options available to Buddhist Reductionists, then
we run into trouble. But what if there is a third option? One possible third
option is that reasons are conventional. Buddhist Reductionists can claim
that, while reasons ultimately don’t exist, they have a conventional
existence. In a footnote, Siderits suggests this response. He writes: “it could
be argued that the notion of a reason for action is unavailable at [the level
of ultimate reality]—that reasons are the sorts of things that only persons
could be said to have.”34 Of course, Siderits denies the reality of persons.
So, it seems that he is committed to the conclusion that reasons don’t
ultimately exist. But Siderits adds that “facts at the ultimate level explain
how it comes to be conventionally true that we have reasons for action.”.
Siderits seems to be claiming:
(5) Reasons don’t exist at the ultimate level of reality.
(6) Reasons exist conventionally.
Now, what does (6) mean? Remember that Siderits deﬁnes conventional
truth as follows: “A sentence is said to be conventionally true if and only if
it reliably leads to successful practice.” Siderits suggests that a statement is
conventionally true if the acceptance of this statement helps us to achieve
good outcomes, such as the reduction of suffering. Suppose that we adopt
this analysis of conventional truth. We can then interpret (6) as equivalent
to:
(7) Accepting that there are reasons reliably leads to successful practice.
It is an interesting question why accepting that reasons exist would promote
desirable outcomes, but let us suppose for the moment that it would. So, the
claim that there are reasons would be conventionally true.35.
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But there’s a problem with the view that reasons are merely conventional. To see why, consider the conventional existence of persons. Buddhist
Reductionists claim that we should accept the personhood convention
because doing so reduces suffering. Now, suppose that you ask “why should
I minimize suffering?” At ﬁrst glance, the only viable answer to this question
invokes reasons. An answer to this question must give you a good reason to
reduce suffering. The content of such reasons can vary. But consider some
possibilities. Someone might argue that you have reason to minimize
suffering because every rational being desires this outcome. Or perhaps that
facilitating this outcome is in your self-interest. Maybe God commands you
to alleviate suffering. Or suffering is intrinsically bad and that is a reason to
reduce it. We can give other explanations for why you could have reasons
to minimize suffering as well.
So, an acceptable answer to the question “why should I minimize
suffering?” is that you have good reasons to minimize suffering. Yet we can
now ask: “why should I believe the statement ‘there is good reason to
minimize suffering on net’?” Suppose that the statement “there is good
reason to minimize suffering on net” is a conventional truth. If this statement
is a conventional truth, then you should accept this statement because doing
so would minimize suffering. But notice that we have now gone in a circle.
This chain of reasoning is in effect claiming:
(8) You have reasons to minimize suffering on net because accepting
that you have reasons to minimize suffering on net would minimize
suffering on net.
Something has gone wrong here. What, exactly?.
Consider an analogy. Suppose that I was trying to persuade you to take
up tennis. Here’s my argument:
(9) You have reasons to play tennis because accepting that you have
reasons to play tennis would cause you to play tennis.
This is a bad argument. Why? It begs the question. Claim (9) presupposes
that playing tennis is valuable, but it gives no independent reasons why this
is so. A better argument for playing tennis would give independent reasons
in favor of playing tennis. For example, you might claim that playing tennis
is fun, it’s good for your health, and so on. Now take (8). Claim (8) also
begs the question. It presupposes that reducing suffering is valuable. But (8)
fails to provide us with any independent reasons to believe that this is the
case.
So, there seems to be something wrong with understanding reasons in
terms of conventional truths. Here’s my diagnosis of the problem. Conventional truths are instrumental to desirable ends, such as happiness, virtue, or
reducing suffering. In other words, conventional truths are instrumentally
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valuable. They help us to achieve our goals. But something that is only
instrumentally valuable must be a means to something else that is intrinsically valuable. If that weren’t the case, then it would be false that this thing
has instrumental value. So, we need some reason to believe that the end
that justiﬁes conventional truths is intrinsically valuable. And this reason
can’t be a conventional truth. If this reason is merely conventional, then it
would beg the question in the same way that (8) and (9) beg the question.
Another way to put the point is that conventional reasons are only
instrumental reasons. For instrumental reasons to have weight, they must
depend on intrinsic reasons. Otherwise, there would be an inﬁnite regress of
value. Thus, conventional truths must bottom out in intrinsic values or
reasons.
Let’s return to the question: why should we reduce suffering? To answer
this question, we must give reasons why should we reduce suffering, and
these reasons must, at some point, be intrinsic reasons, reasons why it is in
itself valuable to reduce suffering. Notice that, to avoid begging the
question, these reasons why reducing suffering is valuable can’t be conventional because conventional reasons are instrumental. The only remaining
possibility is that these reasons are ultimate reasons, reasons that exist from
the perspective of ultimate reality. However, if conventional truths rest on
ultimate reasons, then Buddhist Reductionists are unable to escape the
dilemma that I have laid out. They must still give an analysis of ultimate
reasons. If these reasons are partite, then they lack ultimate existence. And,
if they are impartite, then they conﬂict with core Buddhist commitments.
Let me summarize where the dialectic stands. If truths about reasons
were conventional, then Buddhist Reductionists could accept that there are
no reasons from the perspective of ultimate truth. So, they could embrace
the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma. Yet Buddhist Reductionists could argue that
we still have conventional reasons for action. They could then claim that we
can understand their account in terms of conventional reasons. This would
mitigate the damage from conceding that there are ultimately no reasons.
According to this view, although there are no ultimate reasons, we have
conventional reasons to minimize suffering and conventional reasons to
afﬁrm the existence of persons. I have shown that this path is unavailable to
Buddhist Reductionists. We can’t understand reasons in terms of conventional truths in a non-question-begging way. As a result, the dilemma for
Buddhist Reductionism remains intact.36
B. Help from Abhidharma Metaphysics?
In this subsection, I want to consider the possibility that there is an
alternative understanding of value in the Buddhist tradition that can avoid
the dilemma that I have set out. This understanding comes from the
Abhidharma tradition. As I noted in section 2, Abhidharma metaphysics
holds that ultimate reality consists in dharmas, which we might describe as
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tropes. Some of these dharmas are mental factors and include elements like
greed, hatred, joy, and compassion. Abhidharma philosophers claim that
mental dharmas have normative valences. Certain mental dharmas are good
or wholesome (kusala), while other dharmas are bad or unwholesome
(akusala), and still others are neutral (abyākata). Mental dharmas are good or
bad by virtue of the fact that their ultimate valences are good or bad, and
not because we judge them to be so. In addition, facts about the valence of
dharmas are ultimate truths rather than conventional ones. Thus, Abhidharma treats goodness and badness as fundamental constituents of reality.
The Abhidharma philosophers seem to have thought that the normative
valence of a dharma is not distinct from the dharma itself. Rather, to
experience the dharma fully and clearly just is to see it as wholesome,
neutral, or unwholesome. Unwholesome dharmas such as anger and hatred
produce disturbances in the mind and aversive reactions. In contrast,
wholesome dharmas like compassion and loving-kindness are calming and
bring ease to the mind. By carefully attending to the nature of experience,
we can determine the valence of mental dharmas. Perhaps Abhidharma
philosophers were proposing a kind of non-inferential normative knowledge.
We acquire knowledge of the normative charge of mental dharmas by
skillfully experiencing or observing them, which may require meditation
practice.37.
My dilemma in this article assumes that there are two kinds of theories
of normative reasons on offer: reductionist theories and non-naturalist ones.
But perhaps Buddhist Reductionists can propose another understanding of
value that draws on the Abhidharma tradition, or another version of nonnaturalism or reductionism that avoids the dilemma that I have proposed.
Buddhist Reductionism is arguably committed to something like Abhidharma
metaphysics, at least according to Siderits’ interpretation. So, it is worth
examining whether Buddhist Reductionists can rely on Abhidharma metaphysics to formulate a viable alternative to reductionist and non-naturalist
theories. If that project succeeds, then the dilemma that I have sketched out
is a false one. It turns out that there is another option on the table.
But does the Abhidharma position present a genuine alternative to
reductionist and non-naturalist understandings of normativity? This is
unclear. To see the difﬁculty with this suggestion, let’s assume along with
Abhidharma philosophers that mental dharmas are valenced as good, bad,
or neutral. That’s not enough to get us normative reasons. We also need an
account of how the goodness and badness of mental dharmas link up with,
or generate, these reasons. We use the terms “good” and “bad” in different
ways, and sometimes these usages don’t imply anything about reasons.
Suppose I say of the coat that I am wearing: “this is a good coat.” When I
say this, I just mean that this coat satisﬁes certain standards, like keeping me
warm. By itself, this meaning fails to imply any commitments about the
reasons that I have. At ﬁrst glance, the same point could apply to dharmas.

16 Philosophy East & West

Even if we grant that some dharmas are fundamentally good or bad, we
need to say more to specify what this implies for the reasons that we have
with respect to these dharmas.
To bridge the gap between goodness and badness and normative
reasons, we need to use the terms “good” and “bad” in a reason-implying
sense. When we say that something is good or bad in a reason-implying
sense, we mean that there are facts about this thing’s nature that give us
reasons to respond to this thing in a certain way.38 Suppose that you believe
that happiness is good and pain is bad in a reason-implying sense. If so, you
likely believe that you have reasons to bring about more happiness in your
life and reasons to minimize the amount of pain in it. Let us assume that
mental dharmas are good or bad in a reason-implying sense. The fact that a
dharma is wholesome is presumably a reason to bring about similar dharmas
in the future or the fact that a dharma is bad is a reason to prevent similar
mental dharmas from arising.
But then we need to ask: what is the nature of the reasons to bring about
good dharmas or prevent bad or unwholesome ones? We must now furnish
an account of these normative reasons. Consider pain as an illustration.
Most people agree that we have reason to reduce pain. Why, though? Some
non-naturalists say that we have reasons to reduce pain irrespective of the
judgments that an agent has toward her pain.39 The reasons to minimize
pain are irreducible normative properties. Notice that, according to this
view, your attitudes and beliefs toward pain can be mistaken. Suppose you
thought, strangely, that you should increase the amount of pain in your life,
even though this isn’t necessary to achieve any other good. Well, you would
be wrong. Furthermore, your reasons to avoid pain would not be caused by
your attitudes and judgments because normative truths are independent of
your attitudes. But, if we go this route, we run into the same problems that
confront any attempt to reconcile Buddhist Reductionism with non-naturalism. We would need to reject the causal efﬁcacy criterion of ultimate
existence and other associated commitments.
Yet that is not the only theory of the reason-giving badness of pain on
offer. There is an alternative, attitude-dependent theory.40 This account says
that we have reasons to minimize pain by virtue of the fact that we have
some desire to avoid pain or some judgment that counts against experiencing pain. This would be a reductionist account. Our reasons to minimize
pain are constructed out of psychological states. Once again, though, we
run into the same troubles that beset attempts to marry reductionist accounts
of reasons with Buddhist Reductionism. If reasons are composites of nonnormative properties and composite entities are ultimately unreal, then we
would have to deny that reasons are ultimately real as well. It seems that we
can run through this same exercise with any mental dharmas that Buddhist
Reductionists propose.
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So, it is unclear whether Buddhist Reductionists can offer a viable
understanding of normativity that escapes the dilemma that I have laid out.
Abhidharma metaphysics presents us with a fascinating and suggestive understanding of how normative valences can exist as fundamental constituents of
reality. Yet, even if we accept this picture of the world, we must still give an
account of our reasons to respond to wholesome or unwholesome dharmas in
any particular way. That is where the dilemma I have sketched comes back
into play. Unless we can ﬁgure out a viable alternative to the reductionist and
non-naturalist theories of reasons, the dilemma for Buddhist Reductionists
retains its force. And there is some ground for doubting that Abhidharma
philosophy provides us with this alternative.

V. Conclusion
Can Buddhist philosophy make sense of reasons? In this article, I have
examined whether one important Buddhist view—Buddhist Reductionism—
has the resources to justify the existence of reasons. My diagnosis is
pessimistic. I have argued that Buddhist Reductionism lacks the resources to
make sense of reasons and, furthermore, that this failure casts doubt on the
plausibility of Buddhist Reductionism as a whole. If my argument here is
correct, then Buddhist Reductionists face a stark choice. They must either
endorse skepticism about normative reasons or reject key Buddhist commitments. Neither option is appealing. If nothing else, this conclusion suggests
that Buddhist philosophers have more work to do in clarifying how reasons
ﬁt into their ontologies.
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